“The nonbinding design of the WDO is deliberate. Treaty-based institutions require transparency, accountability, and consensus among states with divergent interests. The WDO avoids a lot of this while still helping China achieve a primary strategic goal: shaping global norms before binding rules crystallize elsewhere. But nonbinding does not mean inconsequential. Standards recommendations flowing from the WDO will likely reflect China’s domestic approach to data—one that maximizes state access to data while restricting outbound flows. Those outputs will not be politically neutral, even when framed as technical best practices.”
“The impact of the WDO is far from certain. Past data-related reactive initiatives have stalled after launch. For example, the GDSI attracted endorsements from Russia, Pakistan, the Arab League, and a handful of others, but Chinese officials’ promotion of the initiative showed a notable slowdown by 2021, with the last recorded diplomatic mention in February 2022. Likewise, nothing much has happened since the launch of the Global Cross-Border Data Flow Cooperation Initiative. But the establishment of the WDO is significant as it marks China’s most ambitious and comprehensive attempt to articulate a constructive, affirmative vision for global data governance. The channels to leverage the organization already exist…”