“North Korea’s recent launches follow a trend of increased missile tests since 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, and Pyongyang leaped at an opportunity to advance its geopolitical position. Beginning in late 2022, North Korea began sending artillery and rocket ammunition to Russia. These transfers increased over the next several years to include KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), anti-tank guided missiles, artillery pieces, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and tank ammunition. On top of this, thousands of North Korean soldiers helped augment Russian forces in Kursk starting in the autumn of 2024.”
“North Korean assistance was motivated by a desire to extract benefits from Russia. Over the course of the past three years, Moscow has provided Pyongyang with significant security assistance, including electronic warfare systems, air defense systems that have both land and maritime applications, satellite launch support, and, perhaps most concerningly, help with its missile program.”
“Russia began using North Korean KN-23 SRBMs against Ukraine in late 2023. Russia has since helped improve the survivability and accuracy of the KN-23, which Pyongyang armed with cluster munitions in an early April 2026 test. The missiles’ terminal maneuverability reportedly improved due to Russian modifications, making them more difficult to intercept. Russia also reportedly improved the KN-23’s accuracy from a circular error probable (CEP)—a measure of ballistic projectile accuracy that combines horizontal and vertical dispersion error—of 500-1,500 meters to 50-100 meters. This was a significant increase in the accuracy of the weapon system and could allow North Korea to engage in counterforce targeting with its missiles (targeting military forces) rather than countervalue targeting (targeting large civilian sites such as cities).”