Indian Ocean Chokepoints: Is China Still Vulnerable?
“In the early 2000s, Beijing’s dependence on the Strait was overwhelming as China had become a net energy importer in 1993. By 2010 […] nearly 77 percent of its energy imports transited Malacca. The same narrow channel also carried most of China’s trade with Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, making it the jugular vein under US naval dominance. Beijing’s unease deepened as the US, India, and Australia expanded their naval cooperation through Malabar exercises. Even after Australia and later India pulled back from the first QUAD, the prospect of a revived alignment among these powers ensured that Chinese sensitivities around chokepoint vulnerabilities remained acute.”
“Therefore, China consistently sought strategies to counter this vulnerability, leading to potential diversion of the majority of maritime traffic through Sunda, Lombok and Ombai-Wetar Straits in Southeast Asia, exploration of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the Arctic, overland oil and gas pipelines from Russia and Central Asia and overland trade routes and railway tracks to destinations in Europe and Asia.”
“China has also sought land-based workarounds. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, it has pushed trade corridors via Pakistan and Myanmar, anchored at Gwadar and Kyaukphyu, to bypass these maritime chokepoints. On paper, these corridors promise access to the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal; in practice, they remain costly, insecure, and strategically fragile…”
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indian-ocean-chokepoints-is-china-still-vulnerable