Four legs bad, three legs better? Rescuing the Quad with an India-Japan-Australia grouping
The Interpreter, Lowy Institute
“The India-Japan-Australia (IJA) trilateral has been in the shadows of the Quad for nearly a decade, despite a promising start in 2015 when the three sides launched a dialogue focused on supply chains, infrastructure, and maritime security. It gathered momentum in 2017 when India’s then foreign secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar hosted his Japanese and Australian counterparts to spotlight converging interests across peace, economic growth, maritime security, counter-terrorism and support for ASEAN centrality in regional architecture.”
“Unlike the Quad, where the United States’ overwhelming presence skews agendas, the IJA grouping rests on a more equal distribution of interests. Each member has faced the realities of China’s rise firsthand, and each has developed its own strategies for coping with Beijing’s assertiveness. What unites them is a shared need for strategic autonomy vis-à-vis both Washington and Beijing.”
“[…] Unlike Washington, which views the Quad largely through the prism of great-power rivalry with Beijing, India finds greater alignment with Japan and Australia – partners that, while wary of China, prioritise resilience, rule-making, and regional stability over outright confrontation. Moreover, Trump’s 50 per cent tariffs on imports from India highlight the structural fragility of relying on Washington. The Quad might still be useful as a platform, but as a long-term pillar of strategy, it leaves India exposed to American unpredictability.”
See also: ‘NY Times: Trump no longer plans to visit India for Quad summit’