Good Neighbors Make Good Fences: The Strategic Basis for a Thai-Vietnamese Entente
“Despite Thailand’s clear superiority in material capabilities, the time and energy needed to deal with these immediate neighbors [Cambodia, Myanmar] simultaneously can be deeply draining. As such, easing pressure on one border to focus on the other would benefit Thailand in the long run, and Vietnam – with its own dual-front dilemma and parallel interests in preserving Indochina’s strategic balance – is a logical partner in that effort.”
“The current convergence between Thailand and Vietnam centers most concretely on China’s activities in Cambodia and Laos. With respect to Cambodia, China is boosting its political clout via the modernized Ream Naval Base and the Funan Techo Canal. Concerns go beyond diminishing Thai and Vietnamese trade influence. The potential for these projects to serve military ends during wartime would severely limit Thailand and Vietnam’s operational maneuverability, making non-alignment practically impossible to sustain because China will pose too much of a threat for either of these countries to confront China alone. In addition to the growing Chinese presence in Cambodia, China’s ambitious investments in Laos and Vientiane’s growing debt to Beijing also increase the risks of Laos falling into a Chinese debt trap, under which it may lease strategic assets to China as compensation. With Laos sharing a long land border with both Thailand and Vietnam and being a battlefield between ancient Thai and Vietnamese kingdoms, China’s footprint in Laos is as concerning to Thailand and Vietnam as its footprint in Cambodia. Welcoming China to Indochina is one thing; accepting an overwhelmingly Chinese-dominated Indochina is another. This is something that is not in the interest of either Thailand or Vietnam.”